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This paper presents an analysis of Muslims in France to counter the myth of a Muslim lobby, 
particularly relating to foreign policy. Assumptions of a Muslim lobby rely on the existence 
of a homogenous voting block which requires: (1) the homogeneity, unity and efficient 
organisation of Muslims, (2) the crucial role of faith in determining their political 
participation and behaviour as well as (3) their strong interest in foreign policy issues. The 
central question is then: are these conditions fulfilled in the case of French Muslims? Is there 
a Muslim voting block?  The study emphasizes three elements to answer this question: the 
heterogeneity of what is understood as ‘Muslims’, the absence of an ethnic vote, the absence 












If the literature on ethnic groups and foreign policy is vast when it comes to the 
United States, it seems this relation has been quite overlooked in Europe (Aggestam & Hill 
2008). It is an American scholar, Francis Fukuyama, who put forward the hypothesis that 
France opposed the 2003 war in Iraq because of its important Muslim community1.  
According to the United States National Intelligence Council, “ongoing societal and political 
tension over integration of Muslims is likely to make European policymakers increasingly 
sensitive to the potential domestic repercussions of any foreign policies for the Middle East, 
including aligning with the U.S. on policies seen as pro-Israeli” (United States National 
Intelligence Council 2008, 25). The idea of a Muslim lobby in Europe, especially in France, 
has been essentially developed by some neoconservatives in the United States and is known, 
under its extreme form, as the ‘Eurabia’ thesis2. 
The political impact and foreign policy opinions of Muslims in the West constitute a growing 
topic of research (Radcliffe Ross 2009, 1). The closer perspective to studying ethnic groups 
and foreign policy deals with security issues in the post 9/11 context. The situation of 
European Muslims is apprehended through the international context and this collusion 
between Islam as an international political threat and Muslims within European countries 
contributes in explaining different tensions (Cesari 2002). The political participation of 
immigrant or ethnic minorities, particularly Muslims, is itself perceived as a threat (Vogel 
2008, 18). Aggestam and Hill place at the core of their study the relation between 
                                                 
1 Fukuyama wrote: "The French government's stance against the Iraq war and US foreign policy more generally 
seeks in part to appease Muslim opinion” in the Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2004. 
2 The Eurabia theory conceives Europe as a dependency of the Arab world and usually considers Muslims and 
Islam generally to be a threat to Europe. Projections are often made in order to predict domestic and foreign 
policy implications of a higher number of Muslims and consequently of Muslim voters (Kauffman 2008). The 
result, usually embedded in the clash of civilizations framework often emphasizes increasing ethnic cleavages 
(Kauffman 2008) and more cautious European states from fear of their “Muslim Streets” dictating domestic and 
foreign policy. In the same vein a segment of the literature goes so far as to foresee the consequences on 
transatlantic relations: the Muslims’ role may even, through elections, lead to the degradation of such relations 
(Taspinar 2003).  Justin Vaïsse provides a snapshot of the most representative works of the Eurabia thesis such 
as Eurabia: the Euro-Arab axis (2005) by Bat Ye’or which essentially theorizes the idea. American literature 
includes explicit titles such as The Last Days of Europe by Laqueur (2007), Menace in Europe by Berlinski 
(2006) or Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (Caldwell 2009). European commentators mentioned are 
Oriana Fallaci’s controversial pamphlet The Rage and the Pride (2002) and Melanie Philips’ Londonistan 
(2007) (Vaïsse 2010). 
 3 
multiculturalism and foreign policy as they consider the 2005 London attacks perpetrated by 
“home-grown” people and more generally Europe as a potential target of terrorism 
(Aggestam & Hill 2008).  In light of these debates, the question of the relation between 
Muslims and foreign policy in the framework of European contexts deserves to be asked.  
This paper focuses on Muslims in France to counter the myth of a Muslim lobby, particularly 
relating to foreign policy. The French assimilation model, emphasizing individual integration 
into a civic culture, rejects any recognition of groups on an ethnic, cultural or religious basis 
(Bertossi 2007, 8). The term lobby also logically holds a strong pejorative connotation 
(Birnbaum 1990, 229). Having said that, French authorities are today aware of the 
multicultural aspect of French society whose model seems very isolated in comparison with 
other European countries (Withol De Wenden 2003). The consideration of groups on an 
ethnic, cultural or religious basis in French social sciences is unfavourably perceived and in 
the worst case, it can even be accused of hiding racist intentions and dividing society 
(Poutignat & Streiff-Fenart 1995, 9).   
In this context, the hypothesis of a Muslim lobby is unlikely. Assumptions of a Muslim 
lobby usually rely on the existence of a homogenous voting block which requires: the 
homogeneity, unity and efficient organisation of Muslims, the crucial role of faith in 
determining their political participation and behaviour as well as their strong interest in 
foreign policy issues. The central question is then: are these conditions fulfilled in the case of 
French Muslims? Is there a Muslim voting block?  This paper emphasizes three elements to 
answer this question: the heterogeneity of what is understood as “Muslims”, the absence of 
an ethnic vote and the absence of foreign policy issues in determining the vote. 
 
 4 




France has the largest Muslim population in Europe. There is no official figure as 
ethnic statistics are forbidden by French law3. The recurrent figure is usually 5 million, 
which represents about 7 or 8 % of the total French population (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 18: 
Godard & Taussig 2007, 24). About 3 million are French citizens (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 
24). The population can be divided along four main groups: 1.5 million of Algerians, 
1 million Moroccans, more than 400 000 Tunisians, nearly 340 000 Sub-Saharan Africans 
and 313 000 Turks (Godard & Taussig 2007, 454).  Immigrants still represent a majority in 
the Moroccan (77% of immigrants) and Tunisian populations (71%). The proportion is even 
higher for Sub-Saharan Africans (88%) (Godard & Taussig 2007, 26). There are around 40 
000 converts (Godard & Taussig 2007, 28). The Muslim population is younger than the 
French general population (IFOP 2009).  
Estimations also differ according to the criteria chosen to define Muslims. Indeed, one can 
have a broad view and build estimation solely on the basis of a ‘Muslim background’ 
without taking into account religious practise. On the contrary, one can choose to have a 
more focused estimation which would take attendance to the mosque as the main criteria 
(Godard & Taussig 2007, 24)4. The common use of the term ‘Muslims’ often refers in fact to 
individuals with a Muslim background independently from their religious practice5.  
                                                 
3 The provision of the Loi Hortefeux allowing for census on race and ethnicity was deemed unconstitutional 
(Schain 2008, 87). Though the last census on religious questions was taken in 1872 and the law forbids keeping 
track of any ethnic statistics, some derogations of the law allow for some estimates (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 
175). A report submitted in February 2010 by a commission of experts (Committee for the measuring of 
diversity and evaluation of discrimination) to the Diversity Commissioner , Yazid Sabeg, suggested to keep this 
framework, whereby “definition of an ethno-racial referential” remains forbidden but the use of “subjective” 
data such as “the feeling of belonging” are allowed (Le Monde, 2 February 2010). 
4 This criteria was used by the Ministry of Interior to estimate the number of practising Muslims: the estimate 
established 220 000 practising Muslims on the basis of the mosque’s attendance criteria which would mean that 
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Muslim immigrants were not perceived as Muslims first but were identified by their ethnic or 
national origin and the Muslim lens only came later on, in the eighties (Silvestri 2007a., 
162). Three phases can be identified; the figure of the “Arab immigrant” of the seventies 
mostly concerned with residency rights and visas, the “civic beur” of the eighties who 
mobilised in associations against racism and discrimination, and finally, the figure of the 
“Muslim citizen” claiming for the right to a Muslim identity and expression of this identity 
(Geisser & Kelfaoui 2001: Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 6). Religion has constituted a growing 
dimension in self-identification as from the seventies onward, Islam has been progressively 
rediscovered by immigrants as the sole variable which allows them to mobilise collectively 
(Dargent 2003, 6). The common experience of exclusion also explains the crystallisation of a 
collective identity (Césari 1994, 115: Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 16). This, possibly along 
with the growing visibility of Islam on the international scene (especially with the Iranian 
Revolution), has legitimized the belonging to Islam. This process of normalisation has 
entailed an increase in self-declared Muslims identifying themselves as believers (Dargent 
2003: Godard & Taussig 2007, 29) and a stronger identity assertiveness and self-declaration 
in younger generations (Dargent 2003, 19: Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 82). Therefore, 
Muslims have a more intense relationship with religion than the general French population6 
(Brouard & Tiberj 2005, 30) as proven by the heavy identification with religious Islam 
(around 78% of the community, 16% adhering  more to its cultural form) though not all are 
regularly practising their religion (Frégosi 2008, 164). Only 10% of the French consider 
                                                                                                                                                       
5% of the 5 million Muslims are regular practising Muslims (Godard & Taussig 2007, 31). However, the 
criteria itself can be debatable as attending the mosque is by no means an obligation, it can conflict with work, 
facilities may be more or less provided and easy to access, and women usually attend less (Godard & Taussig 
2007, 29). 
5 Laurence and Vaïsse approach stands for the common use of the term: “Although this book refers to 
“Muslims”, what is actually meant are those individuals who, by dint of their national origin or ancestry, are of 
Muslim culture or sociological background. The population of course includes many secular-minded citizens 
who would object to being primarily classified as Muslims” (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 74).   
6 66% of the French with North African origin declare themselves as Muslims, 8% Catholic and 20% without 
religion (Brouard & Tiberj 2005). As to the whole French population, 65% declare themselves as Catholic 
(Brouard & Tiberj 2005, 30). However, only 36% of people with Muslim background (personnes de culture 
musulmane) declare themselves as practising and only 15% go regularly to the mosque.  
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religion very important in their lives (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2008, 5). European 
Muslims tend to identify more strongly with their faith than the general populations but this 
does not mean they do not identify strongly with their country of settlement, and this is 
particularly true for the French case (Gallup 2009, 8). 42% of French Muslims see 
themselves as national citizens first while 46% see themselves as Muslims first : this is very 
different from views of their co-religionists elsewhere in Europe, especially in Great-Britain 
where 81% of British Muslims see themselves as Muslims first (Allen 2006). 83% of the 
French general public see themselves as national citizens first rather than Christians (Allen 
2006), which is not surprising as 10% of the French general public consider religion to be 
important in their lives (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2008, 5). Indeed, French Muslims 
appear to be the most European compared with other European Muslims (Schain 2008, 88).  
 
There is no single picture of Muslims. Given the national and ethnic diversity as well as 
the countless forms of belonging to Islam, a dynamic approach is most suited to apprehend 
the Muslim community, or rather communities, in France (Frégosi 2008, 12). Cesari’s 
typology distinguishes three poles7: 
- “Popular and calm” Islam which refers to primo-migrants who have been in France 
for a long time. 
                                                 
7 This typology overlaps with Fregosi’s typology where several figures again can be depicted: 
-Liberal Muslim: refers to a privatized Islam, with no political ambition. It insists on contextualization and the 
alliance of faith with rationality and is best represented by Muslim intellectuals (Frégosi 2008, 138). 
-Subjective Islam of non-practising believers: The trends that would mostly characterize this type are the 
rejection of pure ritualism, an individualization of beliefs (a global trend widely analyzed by Olivier Roy) and a 
secularized Islam (Frégosi 2008, 149). This trend would characterize 42% of French Muslims of whom 14% 
are practising Muslims (Frégosi 2008, 148).  
-Pious and devout believers’ visible Islam: where practise is central and which is heavily based on rites. It 
would correspond to 36% of the entire population (Frégosi 2008, 153).  
-Minimalist Islam: This would best correspond to the vague denomination of people with a Muslim background 
(Frégosi 2008, 157). Identification is mostly socio-cultural and has often little to do with the practise of 
religion. Then, the denomination of Muslims here is more an assigned identity which is also reflected in the use 
of the term arabo-musulman (Frégosi 2008, 159). 
-The last category comprises the rejection of Islam by ex-Muslims and is less visible in France. Some 
associations have emerged in other European countries.  
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- Secular Islam where Islam constitutes more of a cultural than a religious reference 
and which rather concerns younger generations. 
- A process of re-islamicization which also concerns younger generations, usually 
engaged in political militancy against racism and discrimination (Dargent 2003, 16).  
 
Given these conditions, searching for a unitary representation of Islam is an illusion 
(Frégosi 2008, 166). However, as we shall see, this has not prevented French authorities 
from calling for the creation of a representative body.  
 
Muslim organisations and divisions 
 
If most studies assume a ‘uniform discursive framework’ when it comes to Muslims 
(Soysal 1997, 518), they are in fact fragmented in several organisations not only between the 
different European countries but also within each country (Warner & Wenner 2006). The 
absence of any clergy in Islam is one of the factors explaining its lack of organisation and the 
obstacles to building a representative instance (Zehgal 2005, 3). The decentralized structure 
of this faith is reinforced by divisions along countries of origin and attempts by homeland 
authorities to maintain contact with their population, all the more Islam cannot be dissociated 
from ethno-national identity, especially for primo-migrants (Cesari 2002).   
French Islam is predominantly organised on the local level (Godard & Taussig 2007, 40).  
This is explained by the fact that the first most spontaneous organization was the mosque8 
(Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 144). In parallel, diverse associations had, at the end of the 
eighties and beginning of the nineties, started lobbying at the local level. These associations 
have evolved from structures initiated by new French Citizens of North African origin, 
                                                 
8
 There would be more than 1800 mosques on the basis of different data from the Ministry of Interior, regional 
committees of the French Council for the Muslim Faith and regional studies (Godard & Taussig 2007, 116).  
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putting forward Arab ethnicity, to young Muslims associations operating on the field 
(Geisser & Kelfaoui 2001). 
A series of issues brought French Muslims to the front of the public sphere at the end of the 
eighties: the first headscarf affair, the Palestinian Intifada and the Gulf War (Withol De 
Wenden 2003, 78: Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 43). These events contributed to raise the 
French authorities’ awareness of the need for the recognition of the Muslim faith (Zehgal 
2005, 5). A driving incentive for the involvement of the French state in the emergence of a 
specifically French Islam has been to decrease foreign influences and financial dependence 
on foreign sources (Cesari 1993: Zeghal 2005). The agreement on the composition of the  
French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) signed in 2002 by the three big federations (the 
Paris Mosque-GMP, the Union of Muslim Organizations of France-UOIF and the National 
Federation of French Muslims-FNMF9) is the result of a long process which had started at 
the beginning of the nineties (Zehgal 2005, 9). The first French CFCM was elected in April 
2003 with 80% of the prayer spaces participating (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 149). It 
comprises regional councils. 
The CFCM is supposed to be exclusively dedicated to religious issues, not political 
representation (Zehgal 2005). The Council has been most prominent in issues related to the 
certification of halal meat, the organisation of the Hadj and the nomination of Muslim 
chaplains in prisons (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 155). The Council’s commissions have 
shown poor efficiency because of a lack of coordination, of investment and of material 
facilities (Godard & Taussig 2007, 180). Another problem concerns representation: it is 
                                                 
9 The Great Mosque of Paris (GMP) is the oldest institution and is strongly tied to the Algerian government. 
The GMP is being perceived as the most moderate institution (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 102).  The Union of 
Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF) is a strong grassroots force. It comprises 250 civil associations, 
controls 13.5 % of prayer spaces (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 105) and is theologically affiliated to the Muslim 
brotherhood. Its relative success comes from networking at the grassroots level on the one hand and its 
embedment in transnational networks on the other hand (Zehgal 2005, 5). The National Federation of French 
Muslims (FNMF) is under Moroccan influence. The Rally for Muslims in France (RMF) which won the last 
elections in 2008 was created in 2006 by dissidents of the FMNF (Le Nouvel Osbervateur, 23 June 2008).  
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accused of being under excessive foreign influence at the expense of younger generations 
and of being dominated by conservative groups (Salvatore 2004, 1026). Dounia Bouzar, one 
of the six experts appointed by the government, resigned on account of the fact that “For 20 
years, Muslims have been asked to leave their religion at the border in order to integrate, and 
now, we define them solely by their religion!” (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 161). In reaction to 
the CFCM, talks about a representative organisation for secular Muslims had been initiated 
by then Minister of the Interior Dominique de Villepin10 (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 161). 
This again shows the multidimensional aspects of the population designated under the term 
‘Muslims’.  
In relation to foreign policy, the hostage crisis involving two journalists in Iraq in 2004 
episode showed the potential of the Council as the voice for French Muslims on the 
international scene (Fregosi 2008, 324). In fact, as the kidnappers were demanding the 
cancellation of the 2004 law banning religious signs, including the headscarf, in schools, 
Muslim leaders united in one voice calling for the respect of the law and denounced the 
kidnappers (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 171). A diplomatic mission was even sent to Baghdad 
by the CFCM which could be interpreted as a strong and unambiguous sign of support from 
the Muslim leaders.  
It seems that the influence of political Islamic organisations over Muslim populations is 
limited (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 3). If the UOIF tries explicitly to create a Muslim lobby, 
attempts to create Islamic parties or Muslim lobbies have failed. Lists with an emphasis on 
                                                 
10 Examples of these associations include the French Council of Secular Muslims (CFML) or the French secular 
Muslims’ Movement (MMLF) (Frégosi 2008, 392). These secular associations highlight cultural and ethnic 
aspects of belonging to Islam and do not claim any religious practise. However, they are also very fragmented 
(Frégosi 2008, 413). These secular groups claim to speak on behalf of the “silent majority” (Laurence & Vaïsse 
2006, 99) and have emerged around the end of the nineties (Godard & Taussig 2007, 91).  
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issues related to minorities and ethnic communities such as the “Euro-Palestine”11 list did not 
have much success (Giry 2006: Bertossi 2007).  
To conclude, assuming a ‘French Muslim community’ as implying a homogenous, 
organised and coherent body represented by a unitary organization is problematic. On the 
individual level, the term ‘Muslims’ recovers multiple realities and different ways of being 
Muslim, from a simple detached cultural reference to a regular religious practise. On a 
collective and institutional level, the CFCM cannot be considered as a spokesperson for this 
community given its heterogeneity and its competencies exclusively devoted to specifically  
religious issues.  
 
 
2- A Muslim Vote in France? 
 
 
Laurence and Vaïsse reckon that: 
 “as an abstract concept, the notion of a “Muslim vote” has captivated the imagination of 
French politicians (many of whom pursue it) and of some French and US critics, who fear 
that the government is being held hostage by France’s Muslim population, which threatens it 
with electoral punishment (or social unrest) if foreign policy is not to Muslims’ liking” 
(Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 195).  
Muslim voters represent 1.5 million voters which would correspond to 3.75% of all French 
voters (Vaïsse 2007). This number becomes significant provided we show that all these 
voters labelled as ‘Muslims’ vote homogenously.  
                                                 
11
The Euro-Palestine list programme was essentially to denounce the occupation of Palestinian territories and it  
ran candidate in the Ile-de-France region in the 2004 regional elections (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 202). It only 
received 1.83% of votes (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 203). 
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What most distinguishes them is their relative lack of participation. Voter registration is 
much lower for the French of African or Turkish origin, especially for younger people: 23% 
say they are not registered whereas this figure is just 7% for the whole French population 
(Brouard & Tiberj 2005, 49).  
This segment of the population is heavily situated on the left of the political spectrum 
(Dargent 2003) as confirmed by a poll on the eve of the 2007 presidential elections on the 
political orientation of French Muslims (IFOP 2007). 64 % of French Muslims declared their 
vote for Ségolène Royal (Socialist Party candidate), 19 % for François Bayrou (UDF/centrist 
candidate) and 1 % for Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP, main right-wing party)12.  
An essential condition increasing the probability of an ethnic vote is the geographical 
concentration of the group. Immigrant and second-generation populations are geographically 
highly concentrated, especially in big cities like Paris, Marseille, Lyon and their outlying 
suburbs. 60% of all immigrants are concentrated in Paris and its surroundings (Ile-de-France 
region). 35 to 40% of all French Muslims live in the Ile-De-France region, 15 to 20% live 
around Marseille and Nice (PACA region), 15% in Lyon and Grenoble and 5 to 10% live 
around Lille (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 22). Concentration in the industrial and urban areas is 
explained by immigration flows since the sixties when migrants tended to settle in areas 
where factories were in need of labour (IFOP 2006: Dargent 2003, 22). Despite the high 
levels of concentration in some cities, there are very few circumscriptions where immigrants 
represent more than 10% of the population which means that in electoral terms, there are few 
incentives to reach out for the immigrant or ethnic vote.  
 
The constraints of the Republican model also affect the strategies of ethnic or Muslim 
organisations. The assimilation paradigm stressing political integration as well as the 
                                                 
12 La Croix, 24 April 2007. The CSA Institute notes however that the results should be taken with caution 
because of the very small size of the sample. Only 3% of the 5 009 people interviewed declared themselves as 
Muslims.  
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involvement and weight of the state place these groups in a hesitant and therefore weak 
position regarding their mobilisation. This dilemma is clearly apparent in the following 
statement made by the President of the French Muslim Students Association at a UOIF 
meeting:  
“The Young Muslims have passed the stage of a ‘communitarian vote’ in favour of a 
personality who claims to represent them. Their preoccupations are those of the whole 
French society” (quoted in Schain 2008, 108).  
As these associations do not really frame their political participation in terms of ethnic vote, 
there is little pressure from below on political parties to open their doors to more minorities’ 
candidates (Schain 2008, 117). For Withol de Wenden : 
“the French model seems reluctant to implement multiculturalism because the Maghrebis are 
themselves playing a very republican card in their negotiations with French institutions. 
They are expected to receive delegated authority from public powers to maintain order and 
assume cultural identities within the French framework. This equilibrium, which looks like a 
French compromise, can be defined as ‘multiculturalism à la française’” (Withol De Wenden 
2003, 86). Indeed, the strategy of these groups is not to establish themselves along ethnic 
lines, for example via ethnic parties but rather to be considered by main established political 
parties (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, XV).  
Despite all of these elements, the increasing naturalizations as well as the access of 
younger generations to vote have shed light on Muslims as potential voters: this has brought 
about electoral strategies, at least at the local level, as well as increasing attention to 
Muslims’ claims (Godard & Taussig 2007, 110). Seductive strategies aimed at community 
leaders in order to attract ethnic votes take place essentially at the local level (Geisser 2007). 
Sarkozy’s strategy in approaching Muslims, Jews and Asians as voting blocks was quite 
innovative in the French Republican context because of its relative transparency (Giry 2006). 
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As a result, if one may talk about any Muslim or immigrant vote, it is more certainly at the 
local level because of the concentration of the population in some areas (Laurence & Vaïsse 
2006, 198). In this context however, the global debates about Islam do not seem to impact 
the vote (Godard & Taussig 2007, 110). 
At the national level, state efforts to organize Islam, the creation of the CFCM and the 
appointment of government members having immigrant origins can be interpreted as signs of 
the decision-makers’ expectations towards the Muslim communities and as a process of 
recognition of a collective entity (Leveau & Mohsen-Finan 2005). The shift noted earlier 
from ethnic to religious mobilisation is also reflected in candidates’ perceptions: they 
develop strategies to get constituencies they used to perceive as ‘Arab’ or ‘Maghrebi’ and 
that they now perceive as ‘Muslim’ (Godard & Taussig 2007, 110). 
The paradox is that these strategies are developed while the consensus is that there is no 
Muslim vote at the national level (Withol De Wenden 2003, 84: Godard & Taussig 2007, 
110). Though the Muslim vote seems to constitute a concern for the politicians and the 
media, we cannot talk about a Muslim vote unless the religious variable determines the 
choice of the candidate but religious preferences do not seem relevant to understand 
Muslims’ political positions (Giry 2006). There seems to be no causal relationship between 
ethnicity and voting which is done according to traditional partisan cleavages (Bertossi 
2007). The heterogeneity of the population also prevents it from acting as a voting block 
(Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 195). The preference for the left is driven by economic and social 
exclusion.  
The adoption of an ethnic lens by politicians, more than ethnic dynamics, leads to the 
creation of ethnic candidates (International Crisis Group 2006). This can be considered as a 
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self-fulfilling prophecy whereby ethnicization13 results less from the ghettoization of 
minorities than from perceptions of decision-makers (Withol De Wenden 2003, 85: 
International Crisis Group 2006, 24). The Muslim/maghrebi/Arab vote seems to be more an 
imaginary construction leading to the islamicization of this part of the electorate14. 
Therefore, Muslims would constitute a homogenous community only in the eyes of 
politicians creating a tension between the theoretical unity of the republic on the one hand 
and political strategies of mobilising potential and specific electorates on the other hand 
(Giry 2006).  
 
There is no Muslim community, but rather fragmented communities and the Muslim 
vote is less grounded in reality than in politicians and media representations. Nonetheless, do 
Muslim communities cast their vote on the basis of external affairs?  
 
6-Global issues: a remote concern 
 
Foreign-policy: a non-issue?  
 
The increasing presidentialization of power under the Fifth Republic translated into 
the ‘domaine réservé’ which crystallizes foreign-policy making in the hands of the President. 
The French institutional and political context, already poorly propitious to the expression of 
specific interests, is characterized by a strong consensus on foreign policy issues (Laurence 
& Vaïsse 2006, 217). Indeed, the presidential campaign in 2007 was marked by very few 
debates on this theme.  
                                                 
13 Ethnnicization “comes from the representations and incentives of municipalities, political parties and public 
powers than from associative leaders or local elected young elites themselves: they have been chosen as the 
“Arabe de service” (token Arab) to give visibility to public policies, and they are required to stick to 
multicultural aims in the republican frame but not to apply for more ambitious and non-ethnic jobs or goals” 
(Withol De Wenden 2003, 85). 
14 Chat online, lemonde.fr, 28 February 2007.                                                                                                                                 
 15 
There are very few studies dealing with the influence of foreign policy on the vote in 
France15. Foreign policy in general has never been a priority for French voters and does not 
raise voters’ expectations (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 218: IFOP 2006). In a 2006 poll, the 
place of France in the world was ranked last in the list of issues that French people expected 
to be developed by presidential candidates, far behind economic issues, education and 
security (IFOP 2006, 4). The two dimensions deemed as priorities were related to 
development aid (32%) related to the traditional universalistic ambition of reducing North-
South inequalities and the French leading role in the European Union (28%) (IFOP 2006a, 
4). Expectations in terms of foreign policy are closely correlated to the age and political 
tendency of the respondents: younger generations and left sympathizers were more inclined 
to insist on the development aid and international solidarity dimensions (IFOP 2006a, 5). 
Beyond these cleavages, a strong consensus emerged as to the transatlantic relationship, a 
consensus which was unfavourable to the United States: 72% favoured a foreign policy 
distant from the United States whereas only 25% favoured a policy close to the United States 
(IFOP 2006a, 6).  
Economic and social issues constitute the top priorities for the majority of the population, 
Muslims included. Muslims in Europe are first and foremost concerned with economic issues 
and especially unemployment (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006). In a 2002 poll, 
voters that had self-identified as Muslims cited as issues of concern to them in decreasing 
importance: social inequalities, employment, security, education, immigration and finally, in 
the last rank, international politics: then, foreign policy is not a determinant variable when 
voting (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 211). In 2006, 52% of French Muslims said they were very 
worried about unemployment and an additional 32% said they were somewhat concerned 
(Allen 2006). In the 2007 presidential bid, the Socialist Party candidate, Ségolène Royal 
                                                 
15Chat online, lemonde.fr, 28 February 2007.                                                                                                                             
 16 
mobilised 21% of her electorate from African origin on the basis of her projects over 
unemployment (IFOP 2007). Other voters motivated their choice in relation to education 
(17%), social protection or the fight against discrimination (15% for each of these topics), 
immigration or purchasing power (10% for each). Muslims’ concerns are then very similar to 
the whole population’s which means there is no ethnicization of political priorities.  
 
Having said that, the paradox identified earlier still holds: despite its minor role in 
voting, politicians still seem to think that their foreign-policy making can bring them 
additional votes (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 211). This was clearly exemplified by the 
“Boniface Affair” in the Socialist Party. As some people, especially students of Arab origin 
who would normally vote for the Socialist Party said they did not do so in 2002 on account 
of then Prime Minister Lionel Jospin’s position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Boniface 
reckoned that the Socialist Party should be more critical about Israeli policies, which should 
not be confused with anti-Semitism (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 2006). The memo implicitly 
and unquestionably assumed the existence of a Muslim voting block-, that it could be co-
opted and that foreign policy was central (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 212). 
The confusion also comes from politicians themselves as they were expecting the CFCM to 
play a mediating and moderating role in the banlieues for example in 2003. After the 
invasion of Iraq, the CFCM issued a statement calling for “calm and dignity”, and no 
incidents related to this external event were reported (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 209). This 
comes as an echo of the Gulf War, when French decision-makers also developed specific 
strategies of communication and control16 directed to Muslims as the French Ministry of the 
                                                 
16 Regarding the security aspect, some ethnic radios were controlled and some newspapers financed by or in 
favour of Iraq were closed in France (Blanc, Loisel & Sherrer 2005, 133).  The adviser to the Prime Minister at 
that time will say: “the Muslim street was a daily obsession. Permanent cells were on alert (…) Reports over 
some mosques were immediately ordered (…) Everything had to be strictly controlled” (Blanc, Loisel & 
Sherrer 2005, 133). The second aspect emphasized dialogue and communication with main Muslims leaders 
and complements the security aspect in distinguishing between “radicals” and “moderates”, forbidding public 
debate to some currents while legitimizing others. The ultimate goal was reached for decision-makers as proven 
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Interior was then worried about possible repercussions of the conflict in French Muslim 
populations (Blanc, Loisel & Sherrer 2005, 133).   
There is no evidence that the pursuit of policies which would be favourable to Muslims 
would pay off and this includes foreign policy choices (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 198). This 
is again exemplified by the war in Iraq episode which highlighted the convergence of views 
of French Muslims and the French population in general. The Iraqi crisis undoubtedly 
constituted a shift: the strong presidentialization of French foreign policy resulting in the 
association of French opposition to the war in Iraq with former President Chirac lead to a 
“personalized allegiance to the President”  (Leveau 2004, 8-9). Having said that, even though 
former President Chirac was already very popular in Muslim communities after his 
altercation with Israeli security services on his 22 October 1996 visit to East Jerusalem, a 
popularity reinforced by his opposition to the war in Iraq, this did not translate politically 
into a shift in favour of the Right. These events had no impact on voting behaviour 
(Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 213).  
 
The question of loyalty 
 
Eurabia thesis’ assumptions rely on the idea that French intervention in a Muslim 
country could lead to social unrest. This is precisely the reasons that were advanced by some 
commentators when Chirac opposed the war in Iraq. Decision-making in France would then 
be held hostage by the divided loyalties of Muslims whose first allegiance is assumed to go 
to the umma. 80% of French Muslims but only 44% of the French general public think 
Muslims are loyal to the country (Gallup 2009). 35% of the French general public do not 
think Muslims are loyal to the country (Gallup 2009).  
                                                                                                                                                       
by the absence of riots. A member of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that: “nothing moved, at least, 
nothing of what we feared. Everything remained under control: Muslims, firms, public opinion. Some 
demonstrations, but no riots. We maintained control and I conclude we have perfectly managed the Gulf War.” 
(Blanc, Loisel & Sherrer 2005, 133). 
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The increasing Muslim identification identified earlier has brought increasing identification 
or feeling of belonging to the umma, the “global community of the faithful” which includes 
all Muslims (Salvatore 2004, 1015: Silvestri 2007a, 169:  Cesari 2009). This is an essential 
element in connection with international issues. The maintenance of links and networks with 
the countries of origin implies modes of identification that go beyond the national context, 
even while residing permanently in France: these modes of identification question the state 
sovereignty and traditional national allegiances (Cesari 1993, 48). Two global trends can be 
identified in this regard: a diasporic Islam linked to the country of origin and transnational 
Islam where the relation to the umma is emphasized (Cesari 2009, 167). European Muslims 
are mostly to be situated in the second trend, and this is especially mirrored in younger 
generations’ experiences. Satellite television has contributed to the reinforcement of the 
feeling of international solidarity with Muslims (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 92: Godard & 
Taussig 2007, 226). Besides Al-Jazeera success, homeland channels also contribute to 
maintaining transnational relations. However, the web has been now the major instrument in 
fostering links to the homeland or to the umma17. A process can even be identified whereby 
all the Middle East conflicts pictures conveyed by the media fuel mobilisation through “the 
globalisation of perceptions” and through this mobilisation of solidarities, the group is more 
visible (Leveau & Mohsen-Finan 2005). These populations identify with other regions in 
conflict resulting in social “imaginaries” which are difficult to handle for decision-makers 
and for Leveau, this difficulty comes from the unsatisfactory integration policies (Leveau 
2004). Hence there would be a connection between the level of integration of these 
populations and the identification towards other regions in the world (Leveau 2004, 1). Some 
develop a parallel between their living conditions and those of the Palestinian youth engaged 
in the intifada (Cesari 1991, 3). 
                                                 
17 Some websites are frequently used by French Muslims such as saphirnews (acting as a basis for the new 
“Muslim consumerism”), oumma.com (with a more intellectual dimension) or Islamonline, the most prominent 
website, based in Qatar and with a worldwide reach (Godard & Taussig 2007, 192). 
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The issue of double or divided loyalties emerged with the Gulf War (Cesari 1991). In 1991, 
French Muslims’ positions were aligned on Muslims’ positions in the world concerning the 
conflict18. Polls at that time showed Muslims’ fears as to an increase of racism or possible 
expulsions so that religious leaders felt the need to reassert that the conflict did not question 
the rights of the Maghrebi community in France (Cesari 1991, 3: Leveau 2004). Even 
younger generations at that time held positions similar to their parents’: for the first time, 
there was a rapprochement between different generations in terms of values and feelings of 
solidarity (Cesari 1991, 3).  
The gap between French Muslims and the French population positions on this issue had 
several consequences : it created a rupture with the general population, it brought suspicion 
on their mobilisation and claims-making, a distance had for the first time been created with 
the Socialist Party and finally, it revealed an “arab sensitivity”  (Cesari 1991, 128). Having 
said that, Mitterand still kept the support of the banlieues despite the French intervention in 
the Gulf War (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006).  
Politicization takes place through identification and the subsequent positioning on a 
particular policy or event but mobilisation does not necessarily follow as it implies 
organisation and resources (Bennnani-Chraïbi 2007: 152). Though solidarity with the 
Palestinians is heavily displayed and mostly expressed through charities (Godard & Taussig 
2007, 72), it does not translate into strong political action. This is exemplified by the UOIF 
stance on the issue, which refuses to “import” or deal with foreign conflicts as proven by its 
leader's declaration in May 2004 that the Palestinian conflict will not be resolved by French 
Muslim or Jewish citizens’ actions19 (Godard & Taussig 2007, 52). The organisation admits 
                                                 
18 68% of Muslims worldwide and 69% of French Muslims opposed the military intervention in Iraq (Cesari 
1991, 3). 46% of French Muslims opposed French policy on the issue. Views on Saddam Hussein were 
however quite diverse:  55% viewed Saddam Hussein as brave, 43% saw him as dangerous, 29% as crazy and 
9% considered him as a hero (Cesari 1991, 3).  
19 In May 2004, UOIF’s president, Lhaj Thami Brèze stated that: « The Palestinian problem will find its 
solution in Plaestine with the United Nations and Great Powers’ helps, certainly not through French of Muslim 
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no political ambition on this front. Furthermore, it is important to note again that the 
heterogeneity and divisions among French Muslims trump the potential unifying force of the 






Internal considerations related to French Muslims do not seem to constitute an 
explanatory variable among the determinants of French foreign policy. Three essential 
factors counter the myth of a Muslim lobby. 
First, there is no unified Muslim community and as a consequence, no unique representative 
organisation. Furthermore, there is not even a unique definition of a French Muslim as there 
are many forms of belonging to Islam. The institutionalizing process encouraged by the 
French state has lead to an organisation reflecting the divisions and fragmentation of what is 
usually and wrongly designated as the Muslim community. In fact, there are many Muslim 
communities according to divisions along countries of origin, theological divisions and 
generational divisions. 
The second factor is related to the absence of an ethnic vote. Muslim voters’ behaviour 
cannot be explained by the religious factor. The criteria explaining the French general 
population voting behaviour equally apply to Muslim voters. An ethnic vote is at best a 
punctual and local phenomenon.  
Finally, foreign policy considerations only constitute a secondary concern for Muslims 
whose first worries relate to their place in society. Accusations of dual loyalties are 
                                                                                                                                                       
or Jewish confession citizens’ actions…Our responsibility as citizens is to know how to control our own 
impulses for the sake of a common Jewish and Muslim interest” (Godard & Taussig 2007, 52).  He also said in 
an interview: “Concerning the situation of Palestine, UOIF has neither the mandate nor the power to enter into 
political complexities. And so we have decided to act on the humanitarian front” (Laurence & Vaïsse 2006, 
105). 
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significant as long as multiple allegiances translate into political action and mobilisation, 
which is not the case.  
Our conclusion reflects Warner and Wenner’s claim that “the European states with large 
Muslim Populations do exercise a modicum of care in their foreign policies towards Turkey, 
Algeria and the other regions of the world from which their Muslim immigrants have come” 
but, taking Great-Britain’s position on the war in Iraq as evidence and explaining France’s 
and Germany’s with other factors, “they do not however, allow it to determine their foreign 
policy, and they need not: Muslim opinion about “homeland” politics is, as we have shown, 
divided” (Warner & Wenner 2006,  472). The question remains whether this conclusion 




















Aggestam, Lisbeth and Christopher Hill. 2008. The Challenge of Multiculturalism in 
European Foreign Policy. International Affairs 84 (1): 97-114. 
 
Allen, Jodie T. 2006. The French-Muslim Connection. Is France Doing a Better Job of 
Integration than Its Critics? Pew. August 17. 
 
Ayhan, Kaya. 2006. Les Français musulmans: enquête sur une rébellion républicaine.  Revue 
européenne des migrations internationales 22 (3): 135-153. 
 
Bennani-Chraïbi, Mounia.2007. Les conflits du Moyen-Orient au miroir des communautés 
imaginées : la rue arabe existe-t-telle ? Le cas du Maroc. A Contratrio 2 (5): 147-156.  
 
Bertossi, Christophe. 2007. Les Musulmans, la France, l'Europe: contre quelques faux-
semblants en matière d'intégration. IFRI. 
 
Birnbaum, Pierre. 1990. Histoire politique des juifs de France. Paris: Presses de la Fondation 
nationale des sciences politiques.  
 
Blanc, Florent, Sébastien Loisel & Amandine Sherrer. 2005. Politique étrangère et opinions 
publiques : les stratégies gouvernementales d’influence et de contrôle de l’opinion publique à 
l’épreuve de son internationalisation. Raisons Politiques 19 (aout-septembre): 119-141. 
 
Brouard, Sylvain & Vincent Tiberj. 2005. Français comme les autres? 
Enquête sur les citoyens d'origine maghrébine, africaine, et turc. Paris : Presses de Sciences-
Po. 
 
Cesari, Jocelyne. 1991. Guerre du Golfe et Arabes de France. Revue du monde musulman et 
de la Méditérannée 62 (5): 125-129. 
 
Cesari, Jocelyne. 1993. Le national au péril du transnational. Les groupes issus de 




Cesari, Jocelyne. 1994. De l’immigré au minoritaire: les Maghrébins de France. Revue 
européenne des migrations international 10 (1): 109-126. 
 
Cesari, Jocelyne. 2002. L’Islam en Europe: l’incorporation d’une religion. Cahiers d'études 
sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien 33 (janvier-juin): 7-20. 
 
Cesari, Jocelyne. 2003. Citizenship and Political Participation. Oxford-Princeton 
Conference, ‘Muslims in Europe post 9/11’ 25-26 April 2003. 
 
Cesari, Jocelyne. 2009. Islam in the West: From Immigration to Global Islam. Harvard 
Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 8: 148-175. 
 
Dargent, Claude. 2003. Les musulmans déclarés en France: affirmation religieuse, 
subordination sociale et progressisme politiques. Les Cahiers du CEVIPOF 39 (février): 1-
43. 
 
Fregosi, Franck. 2008. Penser l’islam dans la laïcité. Paris : Fayard. 
 
Fregosi, Franck. 2009. Formes de mobilisation collective des musulmans en France et en 
Europe. Revue internationale de politique comparée 16 (1): 41-61. 
 
Gallup. 2009. The Gallup Coexist Index 2009: A Global Study of Interfaith Relations. 
 
Geisser, Vincent. 2007. Ethnicité républicaine : les élites d’origine maghrébine dans le 
système politique français. Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po. 
 
Geisser, Vincent & Schérazade Kelfaoui. 1998. Tabous et enjeux autour de l’ethnicité 
maghrébine dans le système politique français. Revue européenne des migrations 
internationales 14 (2). 
 
Geisser, Vincent & Schérazade Kelfaoui. 2001. Trois générations de militantisme politique 




Godard, Bernard & Sylvie Taussig. 2007. Les musulmans en France. Paris: Robert Laffont. 
 
Giry, Stéphanie. 2005. France and Its Muslims. Foreign Affairs 85 (September/October): 87-
104. 
 
IFOP. 2006. Eléments d’analyse géographique de l’implantation des religions en France. 
Décembre.  
 
IFOP. 2006a. Les Français et la politique étrangère du prochain Président de la République. 
8 décembre. 
 
IFOP. 2007.  Le vote des Français d'origine africaine. 23 mars. 
 
IFOP. 2009. 1989-2009: Enquête sur l’évolution de l’Islam en France. Août. 
 
International Crisis Group. 2006. La France face à ses musulmans : émeutes, jihadisme et 
dépolitisation. Rapport Europe n° 172 (9 mars). 
 
Kaufmann, Eric. 2008. Eurabia? : The Foreign Implications of West Europe’s Religious 
Composition in 2025. Paper prepared for the International Studies Associations (ISA) 
Annual Conference, San Francisco, CA.   
 
Keslassy, Eric. 2009. Ouvrir la politique à la diversité. Institut Montaigne. Note Janvier.  
 
Laurence, Jonathan & Justin Vaïsse. 2006. Integrating Islam. Washington, D. C.: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
 
Leveau, Rémy. 2004. Flux migratoires, imaginaires sociaux et importation des conflits dans 
l’espace euro méditerranéen. University of Texas. 
 




Poutignat, Philippe et Jocelyne Streiff-Fenart. 1995. Théories de l’ethnicité. Paris: PUF. 
 
Radcliffe Ross, Liat. 2009. The Foreign Policy Interests of Muslim Pressure Groups in the 
West. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 50th Annual Convention 
"Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future", New York. 
 
Roy, Olivier. 2004. Globalized Islam. Columbia University Press. 
 
Salvatore, Armando. 2004. Making Public Space: Opportunities and Limits of Collective 
Action Among Muslims in Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30 (5): 1013-
1031. 
 
Schain, Martin A. 2008. The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain, and the United 
States. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Silvestri, Sara. 2007. Asserting Islam in the EU: actors, strategies and priorities in  Foret, 
François (ed.). L’espace public européen à l’épreuve du religieux. Bruxelles: Université 
Libre de Bruxelles publications :159-177. 
 
Silvestri, Sara. 2007a. Muslim Institutions and Political Mobilisation in S. Amghar, 
A.Boubekeur and M.Emerson (Eds.) European Islam: the challenges for public policy and 
society, Brussels/Budapest: CEPS/OSI 2007: 169-182. 
 
Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu. 1997. Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-Making: 
Organized Islam in European Public Spheres. Theory and Society 26 (4): 509-527. 
 
Taspinar Omer. 2003. Europe’s Muslim Street. The Brookings Institution. 
 
The Pew Global Attitudes Project. 2006. Few Signs of Backlash From Western Europeans. 
Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religious and Cultural Identity. 
July 6.  
 
The Pew Global Attitudes Project. 2008. Unfavourable Views of Jews and Muslims on the 
Increase in Europe. September 17.  
 26 
 




Vaïsse, Justin. 2007. La France et ses Musulmans: une politique étrangère sous influence? 
Foreign Policy : Edition Française, (Avril-Mai) :66-71. 
 
Vaïsse, Justin. 2010. Eurabian Follies. Foreign Affairs 89(1): 86-88. 
 
Vogel, Dita (Ed.). 2008. Highly Active Immigrants. A Resource for European Civil Societies. 
Frankfurt: Peter Lang. 
 
Warner, Carolyn M. & Manfred W. Wenner. 2006. Religion and the Political Organization 
of Muslims in Europe. Perspectives on Politics 4 (3): 457-479. 
 
Withol De Wenden, Catherine. 2003. Multiculturalism in France. International Journal on 
Multicultural Societies 5(1): 77-87. 
 
Zehgal, Malika. 2005. La constitution du Conseil Français du Culte Musulman: 
reconnaissance politique d’un Islam français ? Archives de sciences sociales des religions 
129 (janvier-mars): 97-113. 
 
 
